usage, e.g., in (4) Arthur told Mary that she ought to talk to Shirley Makepeace's mother.
The conventions of English allow that 'she' is here used to attribute a second-person reference to Arthur which, in oratio recta, he would convey with 'you.' Williams is correct to point this out, but Castaneda observed twenty-five years ago that 'he', 'she', 'her', etc. can be used to report second-person indexical usage as well as third-person demonstrative reference (see [2] ).
Nowhere did he suggest that 'he*' is the unique quasi-indicator, or that only first-person usages can be conveyed by reflexives.
But now Williams begins to derail. He challenges Castaneda's claim that the quasiindexical assertion of the form δφ*a entails δφba, where δ is any attitudinal verb, φ a predicate, a the main subject, and * the quasi-indicator 'he*' going proxy for a term b. Because 'thinks that' can be understood as establishing either a "transparent" or an "opaque" context, Williams finds an ambiguity in statements like (3) . Read transparently, (3) is entailed by (1), though not so when taken opaquely. Now if Williams takes 'transparent' to imply existential commitment on the speaker's part --so-called 'referential transparency' --a common way to display the transparent reading of (3) is through the de re construction, (5) Arthur believes of Arthur that he is wise.
So understood, (5) is entailed by (1) , since the attitude attributed in (1) is in some sense directed towards Arthur. Generalizing, δφ*a always entails δφaa when * is the first-person quasiindicator and δφaa is read transparently.
But Williams is wrong to think that Castaneda denies this entailment or that he overlooks the ambiguity of (3). Castaneda has written a great deal about the transparent/opaque contrast (see [4] and [5] ), and readily admits both that quasi-indicators are referentially transparent and that (1) entails (3) when the latter is understood as (5) (see [3] , p. 455; [4] , pp. 174-8; [5] , p. 797; [8] , p. 107). What he would insist concerning the case at hand is two things. First, if 'he' in (5) is not the quasi-indicator 'he himself' then (5) does not entail (1) since (5) does not then guarantee that Arthur is thinking of himself in a first-person way. Hence, there is no reduction of (1) to (5) . Second, if (3) is read in the de dicto sense as revealing the exact proposition Arthur thinks, then (1) does not entail (3) since (1) does not imply that Arthur thinks the third-person proposition that Arthur is wise.
Williams obscures this. Impressed by the fact that (1) entails (3) in the transparent de re reading (5), he goes on to repudiate the need for the concept of referential opacity, thereby suggesting that (3) is not ambiguous. This is a mistake. Admit that (1) conveys reference to a res, hence, permits existential generalization and entails (5); it does not follow that (3) is unambiguous. Plainly, the de re reading of (3) does not reveal how Arthur referred to himself and in this respect it differs from (1). In language Castaneda has come to favor, (5) is propositionally opaque because it does not reveal the exact proposition Arthur is said to have thought (see [4] , [5] , [6] , [8] ). However, when a de dicto construal of an attitude report is taken to convey the exact content ascribed to an agent then it is propositionally transparent.
Understood in this way (3) not only expresses something different from (5) but, unlike (5), is false, hence, is not entailed by (1), just as Castaneda claimed in [1] , p. 134. Consquently, while we can agree that (1) entails (5), we must preserve the contrast between the propositionally opaque and transparent readings of (3).
The failure to reduce (1) to either (3) or (5) accords with Castaneda's claim that quasiindexical usage is an indispensible part of the language of other minds, an indispensibility which is parasitic on the irreducibility of indexical reference to non-indexical reference. This irreducibility is due to the presence of indexical modes of presentation in indexical thought; we experience the world in terms of this's and that's, I's and you's, here's, now's, then's, and none of these can be replaced by non-indexical modes. Each reveals the fact that the subject is experiencing things from a particular perspective, and to translate in terms of non-indexical representation is to lose this perspectivity. Moreover, each person's perspective is unique to that person. No one shares my particular here's and I's, and I cannot think in terms of anyone else's this's and you's; perspectival thought is mediated through determinate indexical properties each of which has just one instance (see [8] 
